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Abstract 
This paper both clarifies and broadens the notion of control and its relation to the self.  
By discussing instances of skilful absorption from different cultural backgrounds I 
argue that the notion of control is not as closely related to self-consciousness as is often 
suggested. Experiences of flow and wu-wei exemplify a non self-conscious though 
personal type of control. The intercultural occurrence of this type of behavioural 
control demonstrates its robustness, and questions two long-held intuitions about the 
relation between self-consciousness and the experience of control. The first intuition 
holds that the conscious self initiates and controls actions, thoughts and feelings. The 
second is the view that losing this self-conscious type of control is a negative and 
upsetting experience. By focusing on “the paradox of control” in these experiences of 
skilful absorption, I argue that a feeling of control can occur without a self that 
narratively claims control. Furthermore, this type of control can be a very positive and 
pleasurable experience. Therefore, the common views of the notion of control are in 
need of broader conceptualisation and further refinement. 
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Introduction: control, self and consciousness 
In folk psychology, „being in control‟ is considered an essential aspect of agency. Genuine 
agency, so it claims, can be distinguished from mere bodily movement in virtue of an agent's 
capacity to control his behaviour. But what is control? While control is assigned an 
important role in defining agency, its precise meaning is often obscure. As Bernhard 
Hommel (2007) rightly remarks, current theorising about control suffers from major 
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conceptual flaws. Specifically, it is often unclear to which object control is directed. Samuel 
Klausner (1965) distinguishes four categories of objects, and thus four corresponding 
categories of control: (1) control of performance or behaviour, (2) control of underlying 
physiological drives, (3) control of intellectual functions, and (4) control of emotions. In 
what follows, the notion of control will be limited to the first category.  
A second clarification is required concerning the role of consciousness in control 
processes. There is a strong tendency in scientific and philosophical literature to identify 
control with conscious control. “The belief is often so strong that authors speak of 
„conscious control‟ as if there could be no alternative (i.e. no other type of control is ever 
mentioned)” (Hommel 2007, 161). In philosophical and empirical debates, agential control 
is often seen as a direct product of self-consciousness (Frankfurt 1998; Velleman 2004 and 
2009) and this deliberate conscious control is generally distinguished from automatic, 
stimulus-driven actions (Wegner and Bargh 1998;  Norman and Shallice 1986; Johnson and 
Proctor 2004), as if other forms of control are inconceivable. One possible explanation is 
that it is difficult to ignore the introspective impression that our own conscious will initiates 
our actions (Hommel 2007). When reflecting upon our actions, we have the intuition that we 
- our conscious selves - cause our own actions and are in control of these actions.
i
 Although 
some research suggests this intuition is illusory (Halligan and Oakley 2000; Wilson 2002; 
Wegner 2002), it is nonetheless a very powerful impression which contributes to the 
intuition that the loss of this control would be an upsetting and negative experience (Pockett, 
Banks and Gallagher 2006). Another possible reason why consciousness and control are 
often implicitly identified is the fact that automatic processes are characterised by the fading 
of conscious self-awareness. This gives the impression that control processes will inevitably 
be conscious (Hommel 2007). In this paper I will show that there are types of control other 
than conscious control which are in fact ubiquitous, and that therefore a broader 
conceptualisation of control is needed.  
In what follows I will question two assumptions about the close relationship between 
the feeling of control and self-consciousness, assumptions that are widespread not only in 
our common sense intuitions, but also in scientific and philosophical debates. The first 
assumption holds that the conscious self initiates and controls thoughts, actions and feelings. 
The second is the assumption that the loss of this kind of control is a negative and disturbing 
experience. I will return to this later.  
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Essentially then, the primary assumption is that people are conscious agents in control 
of their own behaviour, with control believed to be something either exerted or possessed by 
„a‟ self (Frankfurt 1998; Velleman 2004 and 2009). Against this view, some authors argue 
that this conscious experience of control is an illusion, and point to the numerous complex 
mental processes that guide behaviour unconsciously (Halligan and Oakley 2000; Wegner 
2002; Wilson 2002). I too intend to question the standard notion of conscious control, but 
from a different point of view. While I will not question the actuality of our common 
experience of controlling our own behaviour, I do intend to show that having a sense of 
control is not as closely related to self-consciousness as we are inclined to think. This I will 
do by discussing some remarkable paradoxes to be found in the characterisation of 
experiences of skilful absorption. More specifically, I will focus on internal tensions in 
Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi‟s notion of flow and the Daoist notion of wu-wei. These terms 
will be explained in the next section.  
Now these experiences, which exemplify the „other types of control‟ mentioned by 
Hommel (2007), are particularly interesting for us here because when they occur, there is a 
feeling of control without the presence of self-consciousness. Nor are these actions purely 
automatic. But because control and self-consciousness are generally believed to be closely 
related, the absence of the latter in the feeling of control leads to what has been called the 
paradox of control. And although it has not yet been discussed in the literature on 
controlling processes, this type of paradoxical process is ubiquitous and universal. This I 
will demonstrate by looking at instances of skilful absorption taken from different cultural 
traditions. I will then focus on the internal tensions characterising these experiences, before 
turning my attention specifically to the paradox of control. I will then show how this 
paradox demonstrates the need for a broader conceptualisation of control. 
To conclude, I will question the second assumption about control mentioned above, one 
which in fact rests upon the first: because the (first) intuition of a self that controls behaviour 
is so strong, one has the impression that losing this type of control would necessarily be an 
upsetting and negative experience. In a departure from the literature on skilful absorption, I 
will end by formulating some arguments that refute this intuition. My claim will be that 
experiences of absorption demonstrate that the loss of self-conscious control may potentially 
be a very positive experience.  
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Flow and wu-wei: A sense of control without a self that claims this control  
Instances of skilful absorption, such as flow and wu-wei, may illustrate that a feeling of 
control need not always be accompanied by a self that claims this control for itself. The 
notion of flow refers to experiences of absorption in an activity performed without self-
conscious control. The activity is performed very efficiently and the actor has the feeling of 
being in control over his actions (Delle Fave and Massimini 2005). Nevertheless, self-
consciousness has temporarily disappeared. Empirical research has shown that this 
experience occurs cross-culturally. (Carli, Delle Fave and Fausto 1998; Moneta 2004a and 
2004b; Asakawa 2004) Flow is very similar to experiences of absorption which occur during 
meditative processes, but it is in fact a much broader notion. It is an experience that occurs 
frequently in everyday life and can - in principle - occur during almost any type of activity, 
from doing the dishes to climbing a mountain. In this sense flow is very similar to the Daoist 
idea of spontaneous action.  
The notion of wu-wei is - just like flow - a metaphor for any action that is performed 
without self-consciousness, and yet is done very efficiently and effortlessly (Slingerland 
2003).  In the next two sections I will take a closer look at the distinctive phenomenology of 
both flow and wu-wei insofar as it challenges common views about the relation between 
control and self-consciousness. The cross-cultural similarity of these phenomena indicates 
that they are universal phenomena.  
 
Flow experiences  
The concept of flow was introduced by Csikszentmihalyi (1975) to describe a specific 
experience of fluid performance in which the actor is not only involved, but is effectively 
immersed. Flow can occur in virtually any activity as long as certain conditions are met 
(Csikszentmihalyi 1998a). Flow occurs when a person‟s skill matches the demands of the 
task at hand, and when the activity has clear goals and provides quick and unambiguous 
feedback. One must know what needs to be done and how well one is doing. When these 
features are present, a subjective state is achieved in which the person is completely 
involved in the activity. Attention is fully invested in the task at hand. This focusing of 
attention leads to a merging of action and awareness: a person in flow has no self-awareness 
aside of the activity being performed, is so completely involved with and immersed in the 
activity that no attention is left over to monitor stimuli irrelevant to the activity. One forgets 
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time, fatigue, worries and even oneself. During flow, self-consciousness is temporary lost. 
This does not mean that the self is completely lost. There is only a loss of the consciousness 
of self. This can be understood in terms of James Mead‟s terms „I‟ and „me‟ (Mead 
1934/1970): “During flow the self manifests itself nondualistically as „I‟ – acting, 
controlling, attending, observing, but not reflecting dialectically. The „me‟ is absent when 
one is fully involved.” (Logan 1998, 178) 
Despite this disappearance of a reflective self, the activity is performed very efficiently 
and the person has a subjective feeling that the outcome of the activity is under his/her 
control. Flow experiences are associated with high levels of control over one‟s behaviour or 
performance. From the point of view which maintains that control and self-consciousness 
are very closely related, if not identical, the idea that this heightened sense of control might 
occur without the presence of self-consciousness may seem paradoxical. However, when 
these notions are detached and their connection is minimised, this paradox resolves itself. I 
will elaborate this idea as we continue. 
 
Wu-wei  
Another example of skilful absorption can be found in classical Daoist texts
ii
, and more 
specifically in descriptions of the notion of wu-wei. The concept of wu-wei consists of two 
Chinese characters: wu (non) and wei (action). Although this is usually translated literally as 
non-action (Needham 1956; Csikszentmihalyi and Ivanhoe 1999) or as doing nothing 
(Graham 1989), wu-wei is in fact a specific type of action. It is action as non-action (Miller 
2003) or effortless action (Slingerland 2003). Wei is ordinary human action performed after 
deliberation and for a purpose, and thus in contrast with the spontaneous processes of nature 
which are “so of themselves” (Graham 1989). Consequently, wu-wei can be described as an 
action without purposive effort. It is associated with “following along with the way things 
naturally are and not adding any human effort” (Xiaogan 1999, 214). Some authors therefore 
describe wu-wei as “not interfering in any way at all with the course of things in the world” 
(Lafargue 2001, 50) or as “refraining from activity contrary to Nature” (Needham 1956, 68). 
Other authors prefer a description of wu-wei that stresses the non-cognitive aspects of this 
type of action. Wu-wei is then described as “nondeliberative, noncalculating, nonpurposive 
action” (Van Norden 1999; Roth 1999) or as “unmediated, unstructured, unprincipled, 
spontaneous action” (Hall 2001). Yet another description of this Daoist concept stresses the 
absence of a distinction between subject and object. David Loy (1985) translates wu-wei as 
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non-dual action because there is “no awareness of an agent that is believed to do the action 
distinct from the objective action done.” (Loy 1985, 73). 
 
Similarities between flow and wu-wei 
Despite some differences
iii
, flow and wu-wei may be considered as very similar 
experiences
iv
 (Csikszentmihalyi 1998b and 1990; Velleman 2008; Jochim 1998). I will 
briefly discuss the most striking similarities between these two notions, giving specific 
attention to some mutual internal tensions. The foremost similarity is that flow and wu-wei 
are both metaphors for a phenomenal state of an actor who acts in an effortless way because 
he is completely immersed in the activity (Csikszentmihalyi 1975; Slingerland 2003). These 
two metaphors refer to a state of skilful absorption conducted without self-conscious control. 
Just like flow, instances of wu-wei are often described as skilful behaviour that becomes 
second nature. “The skilled woodcarver, the skilled butcher, the skilled swimmer does not 
ponder or ratiocinate on the course of action he should take; his skill has become so much 
part of him that he merely acts instinctively and spontaneously and, without knowing why, 
achieves success.” (Watson 1968, 6) However, this does not imply that wu-wei actions are 
automatic, completely unconscious, or purely physiological. These actions contain complex 
cognitive as well as somatic elements. “The individual still makes choices – and may at 
times pause to weigh various options or consider the situation ahead – but even such 
deliberations are performed with a sort of effortless ease.” (Slingerland 2003, 8) Wu-wei 
actions are thus not purely automatic processes. The control that is gained over one‟s action 
entails a gradual learning process in which attention is focused on challenges in the 
surroundings and where skills are perfected as one progresses towards an effortless level of 
performance.  
Since wu-wei and flow both refer to a state of absorption, additional similarities 
include deep concentration and focus on the activity at hand, as well as an absence of self-
consciousness and goal-consciousness. In both experiences, action and awareness merge. 
According to Loy (1985), the most fundamental characteristic of wu-wei is the absence of 
awareness of an agent distinct from the objective action being performed. This is similar to 
flow in which “you‟re so involved in what you‟re doing you aren‟t thinking about yourself 
as separate from the immediate activity” (Csikszentmihalyi 1975, 40).  In the absorption of 
flow and wu-wei, not only self-consciousness but also goal-consciousness temporarily 
disappears. Having a clear goal in mind is an important condition for flow. But during flow, 
consciousness is liberated from all extrinsic goals and concerns. In other words, flow is an 
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intrinsically motivated experience. Similarly, wu-wei involves the forgetting of results. The 
mind is emptied of external goals and judgments and one neither thinks nor hopes for certain 
results or profits. Therefore, both flow and wu-wei are non-reflective experiences (Vitterso 
2003; Van Norden 1999; Roth 1999) in which the action is not controlled in a deliberate 
way.  
  
Internal tensions in flow and wu-wei 
One final similarity between flow and wu-wei is particularly relevant to my investigation of 
the relation between control and self-consciousness. I found that both flow and wu-wei are 
characterised by some striking internal tensions. These are most pronounced in flow. Table 
one summarises the most prominent tensions between the characteristic features of flow.  
  
 
 
First, there is a tension between the subjective perception of one‟s skills and challenges faced, 
and the absence of self-consciousness during flow: namely, they seem to be mutually 
exclusive. One cannot be consciously aware of one‟s skills and the challenges faced in a task 
without the presence of self-consciousness.  
Second, feeling challenged and being aware of the difficulty of the task contrasts with 
the feeling of effortlessness associated with flow. This tension is also found in the notion of 
wu-wei. Chinese philosophers describe the effortless, perfected action represented by wu-wei 
as a state that needs to be trained for and achieved. Sinologist Edward Slingerland (2003) has 
remarked that this trait is in tension with the spontaneous nature of wu-wei, and thus presents 
a paradox. This tension is found in both Confucian and Daoist accounts of wu-wei.
v
 
Slingerland‟s analysis of this paradox can be considered as an expansion of Nivison‟s earlier 
discussion of the “paradox of virtue”. According to Nivison (1996) the cultivation of virtue as 
1. Subjective perception of  
skills and challenges 
Absence of self-evaluation 
2. Subjective perception of challenge Effortless feeling 
3. Clear goals Absence of extrinsic goals 
4. Immediate feedback Absence of self-consciousness 
5. Feeling of control Absence of consciously controlling self 
Table one: Internal tensions in the characterization of flow 
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described in Chinese philosophy is paradoxical, since actions that generate virtue cannot be 
chosen with the explicit aim of cultivating virtue. Philip Ivanhoe (2007) describes the 
motivational aspect of this paradox as follows: “one cannot increase one‟s stock of moral 
charisma if one‟s actions are motivated primarily by the desire to increase one‟s moral 
charisma. This is because moral charisma is enhanced only when one acts out of genuine 
moral motives – and wanting to increase one‟s moral charisma – and thereby one‟s moral 
reputation and „power‟ over others – is not such a motive.” (Ivanhoe 2007: 277) 
Third, having clear goals is in tension with the absence of extrinsic goals during flow. 
Flow is an intrinsically motivated experience of absorption in which no goals other than the 
activity itself appear to consciousness. Nevertheless, having clear goals is an important 
prerequisite for flow to occur.
vi
 The same tension exists between the features of immediate 
feedback and the absence of self-consciousness. And there is a fifth and final tension to be 
addressed: the absence of self-consciousness characteristic of flow seems incompatible with 
the feeling of control that Csikszentmihalyi (1998a) lists as a feature of flow. This tension will 
be further investigated in the next section.
vii
   
 
The paradox of control in flow experiences 
Flow experiences are associated with a high sense of control. Antonella Delle Fave and 
Fausto Massimini (2005) have shown that a phenomenal experience of control is one of the 
most stable characteristics of flow experiences. In their study on the psychological features of 
flow across different activities, they found that the cognitive components of concentration and 
control constitute the core and stable structure of flow, around which affective and 
motivational components fluctuate according to the structure of the associated activities. The 
fact that this sense of control occurs without the presence of self-consciousness is said to be 
one of the paradoxes of flow (Csikszentmihalyi 1999). One must be in control of the activity 
to experience flow, yet one should not try to consciously control what one is doing. 
Csikszentmihalyi (1975, 1987, 1990 and 1996) tried to clarify this paradox by introducing the 
notion of potential control: 
 
Thus the flow experience is typically described as involving a sense of 
control – or, more precisely, as lacking a sense of worry about losing 
control that is typical in many situations of normal life. Here is how a 
dancer expresses this dimension of the flow experience: “A strong 
relaxation and calmness comes over me. I have no worries of failure. 
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(…)” And a chess player: “I have a general feeling of well-being, and 
that I am in complete control of my world.” What these respondents are 
actually describing is the possibility, rather than the actuality, of control 
[my emphasis]. The ballet dancer may fall, break her leg, and never make 
the perfect turn, and the chess player may be defeated and never become 
a champion. But at least in principle, in the world of flow perfection is 
attainable. (Csikszentmihalyi 1990, 59-60) 
 
He describes the sense of control characteristic of flow as a lack of concern regarding one‟s 
ability to control the situation (Csikszentmihalyi 1987) or as an absence of the fear of failure 
(Csikszentmihalyi 1996). Some people might be prone to call this “a feeling of total control; 
but actually we are not in control, it‟s just that the issue does not even come up.” 
(Csikszentmihalyi 1996, 112) The notion of potentiality has not been documented or 
explained by previous literature or research. Csikszentmihalyi‟s use of the concept suggests it 
can be best understood in terms of the absence of self-reflection during flow. It is only by 
looking reflectively at the flow experience that it will give rise to an actual sense of control, 
which primarily occurs after the flow episode: “(…) in flow (…) he is in control of his actions 
and of the environment. He has no active awareness of control but is simply not worried by 
the possibility of lack of control. Later, in thinking back on the flow episode, he will usually 
conclude that, for the duration of the flow episode, his skills were adequate for meeting 
environmental demands; and this reflection might become an important component of a 
positive self-concept.” (Csikszentmihalyi 1975, 44)  
But even with this explanation, the notion of potential control does not clarify the sense 
of control characteristic for flow experiences. On the contrary, the notion is rather confusing 
since it is not clear in what precisely this potentiality consists. Does it involve a potential for 
self-conscious control, or a potential for something else? In the first case, the notion is even 
more confusing because it then seems to suggest that only the only genuine form of control 
involves the self-conscious or reflective awareness of control. Because of these obscurities I 
will not use the concept of potential control in my further examination of the specific sense of 
control characteristic for instances of skilful absorption. I will approach the paradox of control 
in a different way. The paradox may resolve itself if one broadens the conceptualisation of 
control. If one assumes that control is identical with conscious control, then the two crucial 
features of flow - having a sense of control and the absence of self-consciousness - become 
incompatible, and this implies that flow is defined inconsistently. In what follows, I will show 
 10 
that these features need not be incompatible were one to adopt a broader view of control. In 
this manner I hope to avoid the refutation of the subjective feeling of control that has been 
proven to be a stable feature of flow (Delle Fave and Massimini 2005).   
 
Broadening the notion of control 
The paradox of control in flow experiences demands further clarification of the notion of 
control. While control generally refers to a self-conscious awareness of control, flow 
exemplifies a type of non self-conscious, though personal, control. This type of control falls 
outside the scope of classical dual-process models in which rational, conscious processes are 
distinguished from non-conscious automatic processes. Conscious processes are generally 
considered to be mental acts of which we are aware, that we intend, that require effort, and 
that we can control (Bargh and Chartrand 1999). Although there is no consensus on the 
features of automatic processes, they are generally related to subpersonal processes like 
reflexes. These processes involve a form of behavioural control that is unconscious and non-
intentional. John Bargh and Tanya Chartrand (1999) have claimed that some automatic 
processes, like the effortless actions of an expert, do involve an intentional stance. 
Experiences of flow and wu-wei are very similar to these expert experiences. While Bargh 
and Chartrand (1999) categorise these experiences as automatic control processes, we prefer 
to classify them under a third category of control. Along with conscious control and the non-
conscious control of total automaticity, we associate flow and wu-wei with non-conscious but 
personal control. We call it a personal type of control because during skilful absorption the 
self is still active but not in a reflective way. As Csikszentmihalyi (1990) already made clear, 
the fading of self-consciousness during flow does not imply a complete loss or transcendence 
of the self. The sense of control one has in flow is connected to a specific sense of self that 
can be described as follows: 
 
The absence of the self from consciousness does not mean that a person 
in flow has given up the control of his psychic energy, or that she is 
unaware of what happens in her body or in her mind. In fact the opposite 
is usually true. When people first learn about the flow experience they 
sometimes assume that lack of self-consciousness has something to do 
with a passive obliteration of the self, a “going with the flow” Southern 
California-style. But in fact the optimal experience involves a very active 
role for the self. A violinist must be extremely aware of every movement 
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of her fingers, as well as of the sound entering her ears, and of the total 
form of the piece she is playing, both analytically, note by note, and 
holistically, in terms of its overall design. A good runner is usually aware 
of every relevant muscle in his body, or the rhythm of his breathing, as 
well as the performance of his competitors within the overall strategy of 
the race. (Csikszentmihalyi 1990, 64) 
 
If the self is still active during flow, which aspects of the self disappear during flow? I suggest 
that flow involves an absence of the narrative dimension of the self. Flow involves a feeling 
of control without the presence of a narrative self. Allow me to clarify this. When we carry 
out an action, we usually have the feeling “that we are both the author and the owner of our 
own actions.” (Choudhury and Blakemore 2006, 39). These feelings are generally explained 
by the narrative dimension of the self. Daniel Dennett (1991 and 1992) describes the self as 
the principal character at the centre of an autobiography that is continuously written and 
rewritten: “Our fundamental tactic of self-protection, self-control and self-definition, is not 
spinning webs or building dams, but telling stories, and more particularly concocting and 
controlling the story we tell others – and ourselves – about who we are. (…) Their effect on 
the audience is to encourage them to (try) to posit a unified agent whose words are, about 
whom they are: in short, to posit a center of narrative gravity.” (Dennett 1991, 418) 
This narrative capacity is the basis of our sense of a continuous and consistent self. All 
our experiences are brought together in a consistent story or autobiography about “the self”. 
The narrator gives us the impression that we - our conscious selves - are the owner and the 
initiator of our actions, thoughts and feelings. In telling stories to ourselves and others, the 
self appropriates its own actions, thoughts and feelings. It is this appropriation that gives rise 
to an intuition of conscious control and authorship. Some authors suggest this intuition is 
illusory (Hamilton 1996; Halligan and Oakley 2000; Wilson 2002; Wegner 2002). Others 
believe it is an essential component of conscious awareness. For instance, consciously 
experiencing pain not only implies the activation of specific regions of the brain, but also a 
process in which the experiences of pain are integrated in one‟s personal biography (Damasio 
1999). This line of argumentation resembles that of the higher order theorists of 
consciousness (Rosenthal 2002). They believe that a first order mental state only become 
conscious when a second order mental state takes it as its object. The second order mental 
state then connects the first order state with the self. In this way the self appropriates first 
order thoughts.  
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When flow experiences are said to involve an absence of the self, this refers to the 
absence of a narrative self claiming control over the action.
viii
  I want to emphasise here that I 
am not addressing questions of identity. Although the notion of a narrative self is mostly used 
in discussions on the actuality or fictionality of the self, I am consciously bracketing these 
discussions. Therefore, I am only referring here to the mechanism that creates the character of 
the mental story of our autobiography. It is thus useful to distinguish between the narrator and 
the character that is created by this narrator. When I hypothesise the absence of a narrative 
self during flow, I am referring to the absence of a narrator or a narrative mechanism that is 
claiming control over the action by creating stories of authorship and ownership.  During flow 
this narrative awareness of control is (temporarily) absent. In these experiences it is the non-
narrative, phenomenal self that controls behaviour.   
Now the question arises whether this narrative dimension is completely absent in 
every flow experience? I will explore this question in the next section. I postulate that in some 
flow experiences, narratives can arise in consciousness, while in others all narratives have 
disappeared. This gradual approach to instances of skilful absorption can also be found in 
literature on meditation and other experiences that are closely related to flow.  
 
Different gradations of self-consciousness in experiences with a sense of control 
As we have already seen, flow can occur in a wide range of activities. Examples frequently 
cited include complex activities such as mountain climbing or playing a musical instrument. 
But flow can also occur in more trivial activities, such as conversating or doing the dishes. I 
already discussed the features that characterise this broad range of flow experiences. But it is 
not clear how many of these characteristics need to be present for flow to occur (Kiemiecik 
and Stein 1992). In one passage, Csikszentmihalyi states that flow occurs when at least one of 
these features is present (Csikszentmihalyi 1990, 49), while in another passage he gives the 
impression that they all have to be present for flow to occur (Csikszentmihalyi 1998a, 33). In 
yet another passage we find a possible clarification of his point of view: “As long as we keep 
the essential component of the experience the same, we will be still talking about the same 
phenomenon, albeit at very different levels of intensity and complexity. In other words, my 
impression is that the experience of flow is on a continuum between almost imperceptible 
microflow events, and the truly memorable occasions of deep flow.” (Csikszentmihalyi 1992, 
183) 
In his more recent work, this „essential component‟ of flow is said to be total 
involvement in an activity (Csikszentmihaly et al. 2005).  Flow involves intense and focused 
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concentration on what one is doing at the present moment.  Empirical research by Delle Fave 
and Massimini (2005) confirms this and adds to it a high sense of control over the situation. 
These components are said to be the most stable aspects of the structure of flow.   
These experiences of focused concentration and heightened control occur at different 
levels of intensity and complexity. Csikszentmihalyi refers here to the notions microflow and 
deep flow which he introduced in his early work (Csikszentmihalyi 1975). Microflow occurs 
in seemingly trivial activities like reading a book, watching television or talking to someone. 
These are the “weakly structured, low-challenge counterparts of the fully developed flow 
activities.” (Csikszentmihalyi 1975, 142) These notions are problematic for the model of flow 
currently in use, where flow occurs only when challenges and skills are above the personal 
mean (Massimini and Carli 1998).  Research has shown that these experiences do not have the 
positive effects typical of flow experiences (Massimini and Carli 1998), and so this model 
transforms the domain of microflow into the domain of apathy, which includes experiences 
characterised by a low level challenge and a high level of skills (Massimini and Carli 1998). 
This problem needs further investigation.  
Notwithstanding this methodological problem within the flow model, it is still useful 
to talk about different levels of intensity across different flow experiences. The degree of 
absorption in an activity can vary across flow experiences. In some flow experiences the 
immersion in the activity is incomplete, allowing certain narratives to arise in consciousness. 
A certain degree of self-consciousness is, for example, possible when writing a diary. In more 
intensely absorbed states these narratives do not arise in consciousness. This will be the case 
in complex activities that require a complete focus of attention, such as mountaineering.  
Self-consciousness can thus occur in different degrees across flow experiences. But in 
all these experiences there is a high degree of control over the activity. We can say that 
different flow experiences can occur in different gradations between self-conscious and non 
self-conscious control. Every flow experience has different properties and can be placed at a 
specific location on the continuum of absorption. This gradual approach to instances of skilful 
absorption can also be found in literature on meditative absorption and wu-wei.  
Meditative processes
ix
 may be associated with a gradual fading of self-consciousness, 
while control over one‟s breathing, thoughts and feelings is unusually high. In his analysis of 
the different stages that a person goes through during meditation, James Austin (2001) 
describes how the self is gradually deconstructed and transformed. If the self is considered to 
be a multi-layered construct
x
, then meditative absorption may be seen as a gradual peeling 
process. In the first stage of meditation some unusual bodily and visual sensations may occur. 
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At this level no changes in self-consciousness are registered. This only starts at the stage of 
absorption
xi
, where consciousness is clear and focused while the self gradually fades away. 
Because sensory input is impeded or blocked, the explicit physical self - the so-called body 
image (Gallagher and Cole 1995) - will disappear. In yet deeper stages of absorption the 
sensory blockade expands to other parts of the brain, including the limbic system. This will 
eliminate every affective connection to perceptions and thoughts.
xii
 The subject focuses on the 
objective immediate perception of the here and now. As Austin stresses, this does not mean 
that the self and all emotions have completely disappeared, which would be impossible. 
Rather, a there remains a pragmatic self - the „I‟ as agent. (Austin 2001)  
Wu-wei actions also occur with different gradations of intensity, so it is useful to 
distinguish between wu-wei as a spiritual ideal and wu-wei in the practice of daily life. In 
most classical Daoist texts, wu-wei is described as the ideal attitude of the sage. Liu Xiaogan 
(1999) calls this an entirely natural form of wu-wei, involving freedom from any internal 
striving. But when one is trying to apply this wisdom into one‟s life, it is evident that this state 
of effortlessness and naturalness is not attained directly. One first has to specify this natural 
way of acting as a goal to be attained, which means that one must deliberately want to be wu-
wei. This is called an intentional form of wu-wei. It is considered a lower form of wu-wei 
than the entirely natural one which embodies the spiritual ideal of wu-wei (Xiaogan 1999).  
Flow experiences, meditative absorption and wu-wei actions can thus occur with different 
gradations of intensity. Some instances involve intentional and self-conscious processes, 
while others are completely spontaneous and non-self-conscious. Just like flow, all wu-wei 
actions involve a high level of control over the activity. The activity is performed very 
efficiently, and this occurs without effort or self-conscious intervention. The different 
instances of absorption discussed above are all associated with an experience of thorough 
control over one‟s actions, whereas the level of self-consciousness is variable. This suggests 
that the heightened sense of control in these experiences has nothing to do with the 
intervention of the self creating a narrative about these experiences. And this implies that 
common views on control are mistaken when they identify the narrative or reflective self with 
the behavioural centre of control.  
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The loss of conscious control can be a positive experience 
Another widespread intuition is the belief that the loss of self-conscious control is always a 
negative experience. People do not enjoy „being out of control‟. In a discussion on 
determinism, Daniel Dennett expresses this intuition as follows: “(…) we very definitely do 
not want to lose control or be out of control or be controlled by something or some one else – 
like a marionette or puppet. We want to be in control, and to control both ourselves and our 
destinies.” (Dennett 1984, 51) This intuition of fear for the loss of control is closely related to 
the first intuition that I discussed in this paper. It is because the idea of consciously 
controlling our behaviour is so strongly embedded in our intuition that the loss of this type of 
control is considered upsetting. As the following quote makes clear, these two intuitions are 
closely related: “All normal humans experience a kind of basic, on-the ground certainty that 
we, our conscious selves, cause our own voluntary acts. When this certainty is removed (for 
example, by whatever causes schizofrenia), its loss tends to be very upsetting.” (Pocket, 
Banks and Gallagher 2006, 1) 
In pathological cases the loss of self-conscious control is evidently upsetting. But this 
does not entail that the same holds for all experiences of non self-consciousness. In the 
experiences of skilful absorption discussed above, the loss of self-consciousness is neither an 
upsetting nor negative experience. Based on research of these experiences, I will now 
demonstrate how these experiences may contribute to the actor‟s quality of life. By 
distinguishing this type of unself-conscious experiences from pathological cases, I will show 
how common sense intuitions on control are oversimplified.  
The literature on skilful absorption shows that these experiences are performed very 
efficiently and contribute to the general quality of life of the actor. Experiences of flow, 
meditative absorption and wu-wei lack self-conscious control over behaviour, but 
nevertheless have various positive effects on the actor.  
One specific characteristic of flow experiences is their enjoyable and rewarding 
nature. Flow experiences are associated with great inner clarity or an ordered consciousness. 
Their internal harmony makes these experiences very enjoyable, but because of one‟s 
absorption in the activity, this is often not noticed during the experience itself – it is only 
realised afterward (Csikszentmihalyi 1998a). Research has shown that flow is not only 
beneficial while it is taking place, but that it also contributes to the overall quality of the 
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actor‟s life (Massimini and Carli 1998; Lefevre 1998; Wells 1998; Csikszentmihalyi 1998a). 
People who experience flow frequently claim to be happier, more cheerful, friendly, strong, 
concentrated and sociable (Massimini and Carli 1998). This carry-over effect of flow not only 
induces more positive emotions, but also influences other psychological processes. These 
people also turned out to be more motivated, creative and satisfied (Massimini and Carli 
1998; Lefevre 1998). 
Just like flow, meditative absorption is characterised by a heightened sense of control. 
Attention is focused on a limited stimulus field and consciousness is freed from the 
domination of impulses, thoughts and feelings. As concentration is heightened, self-
consciousness fades into the background, and in more advanced states, the self will be 
transcended (Austin 2001). Research on the effects of meditation has shown that these 
experiences of intense absorption have positive effects on the person performing it. Studies 
have shown that meditation has positive effects on the physiological, psychological, 
transpersonal and behavioural level. A survey of these studies can be found in Shauna 
Shapiro, Gary Schwartz and Craig Santerre (2005). Meditation has proved effective in 
interventions for cardiovascular disease, chronic pain, anxiety and panic disorders, substance 
abuse and reduction of depressive symptoms. Concerning psychological health, increases 
have been observed in the levels of happiness, self-actualisation and empathy, on one‟s sense 
of coherence, stress-resistance and self-esteem. Positive behavioural effects documented in 
the literature include heightened perception, improvements in reaction time and responsive 
motor skills, and increased concentration and attention. (Shapiro et al. 2005) 
As an instance of skilful absorption, wu-wei is - just like flow - associated with an 
efficient performance of the activity. Actions that follow the principle of wu-wei are believed 
to give better results than acting purposively (Xiaogan 2001). Wu-wei is not a negation of 
action, but aims at a higher standard of human action, meaning “a balance between minimal 
effort and best results.” (Xiaogan 2001, 334)  This efficient way of performing an action is 
also associated with mental tranquillity: wu-wei has, just like flow, a positive influence on the 
performance and clarity of mind of the actor. Acting according to the principle wu-wei will 
additionally have positive effects on the actor‟s environment. These actions are said to be 
spontaneous and natural in the sense that they do not harm the environment but engender 
harmony with it.  
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Conclusions  
In this paper I approached the relation between the notions of control and self by discussing 
different instances of skilful absorption and the positive effects they bring about. Because 
people do not have a clear sense of what being in control means, two common-sense 
intuitions on control were critically approached and clarified in this paper. The first one holds 
that it is the conscious self that initiates and controls our thoughts, actions and feelings. I 
nuanced this idea by showing that behavioural control is not as closely related to the reflective 
self as our intuition suggests. A feeling of control can occur without a narrating self that 
claims this power of control. I have shown that different experiences of flow, wu-wei and 
meditation can be placed on a continuum from modest to deeper absorption. These different 
types of absorption are all associated with a high sense of control over one‟s actions, whereas 
the level of self-consciousness is variable. This suggests that the heightened sense of control 
in these experiences has nothing to do with the intervention of a self that claims to be in 
control. The narrative integration of our experiences gives us the false impression that our 
conscious selves initiate and own these experiences. This narrative dimension can occur in 
different gradations, but even when it is completely absent, behaviour can be controlled very 
efficiently.  In these cases it is the non-reflective phenomenal self which controls behaviour. 
The specific sense of control characteristic of these instances of skilful absorption 
necessitates a broader conceptualisation of control. This paper has shown that apart from the 
reflective, conscious type of control that is generally intended, control can also be associated 
with non-reflective personal processes as well as with automatic non-conscious processes. 
This subdivision adds one more dimension to classical dual-process models which distinguish 
conscious from automatic processes (Bargh and Chartrand 1999). In experiences of flow and 
wu-wei, a non-reflective sense of control arises in which the self still plays an active role.  
A second conclusion that can be drawn is that losing self-conscious control over one‟s 
behaviour is not always a negative experience. This conclusion may nuance the common 
sense intuition that the loss of self-conscious control is an upsetting experience. By 
distinguishing positive unself-conscious experiences from pathological cases, I have shown 
that this intuition concerning control is oversimplified. The experiences of skilful absorption 
that I discussed lack self-conscious control, but nevertheless have been shown to be 
pleasurable and to contribute to an individual‟s overall quality of life.  
In addition to broadening the conceptualisation of the notion of control, this has paper 
also contributed to the elaboration of the notion of flow. I focused on the relation between 
flow and the self by discussing some internal tensions in flow and by putting flow experiences 
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on a continuum. Since not all the internal tensions I discussed have been solved, further 
research on the intricate relation between flow and the self is necessary. This article focused 
mainly on one specific tension related to the paradox of control in flow. One has to be in 
control of an activity to experience flow, yet one should not try to self-consciously control 
what one is doing. Further research on this specific feeling of control that occurs without a 
narrative self claiming control over behaviour will be necessary.  
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i
 In scientific and philosophical literature as well as in common sense intuitions, the self is generally associated 
or identified with self-reflection. The self is seen as the observer of one‟s actions, feelings and thoughts. But this 
capacity of self-reflection is only one layer of the self.  The self has more than one dimension. Experiencing 
one‟s self does not always involve a reflective stance towards one‟s own actions, feelings or thoughts. Apart 
from a reflective self that is generally intended by the notion, the self also includes non-reflective components. In 
response to an overly reflective approach to the self, some authors stress the importance of the non-reflective 
dimension of the bodily and social components of the self (Gallagher and Cole 1995; Neisser 1993). This 
difference between reflective and non-reflective components of the self was already made by William James 
(1901). He distinguished the reflective or conscious „me‟ from the non-reflective „I‟.  In order to illustrate some 
shortcomings in the traditional literature on self-consciousness and control, I will use the notion of the self in its 
most narrow sense. Self and self-consciousness will be used interchangeably and will be understood as a higher-
order reflective mental process. 
ii
 Wu-wei is a spiritual ideal that is discussed often in classical Chinese texts. This ideal does not only appear in 
the work of classical Daoist thinkers like Laozi and Zhuangzi, but also in the Confucian and Neoconfucian 
works of Confucius, Mencius and Xunzi. Generally the notion of wu-wei is associated with Daoism rather than 
with Confucianism, because the idea is more frequently and elaborately discussed by Daoist authors. 
iii
 We can summarise these differences into three points. A first point of difference lies in the process of self-
cultivation associated with both notions. Flow is said to bring about a complexification and actualisation of the 
self.  Frequently experiencing flow results in more complex skills and challenges and in this way empowers the 
self (Csikszentmihalyi 1993; Wells 1998). This type of self-development is of another type than the Daoist one 
which is rooted in a spiritual tradition. The self-cultivation related to practicing wu-wei requires a modification 
of one‟s behaviour and purification of the mind. This involves a deconstruction of the self and a reduction of 
personal desires and goals.  This is associated with a „forgetting‟ of the self.  A second point of difference is the 
fact that flow only refers to an individual experience of internal harmony, while the internal harmony of wu-wei 
actions also involves an external harmony. In Daoism experiencing internal harmony involves a harmonious 
relation with the environment. A third point of difference lies in the normative connotation of both notions. Flow 
is a scientific term that is morally neutral. Flow can refer to actions that are morally good or wrong. Wu-wei, on 
the other hand, is in the first place a religious or spiritual ideal that involves relating the individual to a larger 
normative, cosmic order (Slingerland 2003). Wu-wei is a state of personal harmony in which actions are 
harmonized with the demands of conventional morality. In Daoist texts this is believed to occur without 
following moral principles or rules.  
iv
 Csikszentmihalyi himself pointed at their relatedness (Csikszentmihalyi 1990 & 1998a; Csikszentmihalyi and 
Jackson 1999). Instead of wu-wei he focused on another Taoist concept, „yu‟.  Yu refers to the right way of 
following the Way or Dao. It can be translated as wandering, “walking without touching the ground”, swimming, 
flying or “flowing” (Csikszentmihalyi 1998a, 380-382). This metaphor frequently occurs in the writings of 
Zhuangzi. It refers to a “totally free and purposeless” attitude (Watson 1968, 6). Csikszentmihalyi points at the 
similarity with flow: “Chuang Tzu believed that to Yu was the proper way to live – without concern for external 
rewards, spontaneously, with total commitment – in short, as a total autotelic experience.” (Csikszentmihalyi 
1990, 150) This Daoist metaphor for an aimless but very efficient performance of an artist or craftsman is thus 
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very closely related to wu-wei, which is “a course of action that is not founded upon any purposeful motives of 
gain or striving” (Watson 1968, 6). Csikszentmihalyi believes this Daoist idea of spontaneous action is not any 
different for what he calls flow. He remarks that one might think they are different, because flow is related to the 
mastery of challenges, while Daoists focus on spiritual playfulness in which the individual gives up conscious 
mastery (Csikszentmihalyi 1990, 150). He believes however that this difference is insignificant since yu also 
depends on the discovery of new challenges and the development of new skills: “The mystical heights of the Yu 
are not attained by some superhuman quantum jump, but simply by the gradual focusing of attention on the 
opportunities for actions in one‟s environment, which results in a perfection of skills that with time becomes so 
thoroughly automatic as to seem spontaneous and otherworldly.” (Csikszentmihalyi 1990, 151) In this 
interpretation flow and the Daoist view on spontaneous actions are believed to be the same experience.  
v
 Confucians tend to describe wu-wei by emphasising the effort and training that is required to achieve the 
proper attitude that brings it about. But this description is problematic. How can one try not to try? The 
successful cultivation of wu-wei requires the proper internal motivation. How can one otherwise be trained to 
spontaneously, unself-consciously love the Way if one does not love it already? (Slingerland 2003, 13) This 
problem motivated Daoist thinkers to emphasise the effortless and spontaneous qualities of wu-wei. One does 
not have to train or try to achieve wu-wei. It comes about naturally. There is yet another problem with this 
description. If the path towards wu-wei is so effortless and spontaneous, then why do these Daoist thinkers have 
to tell us to pursue it? Slingerland (2003) concludes that both ways of describing wu-wei are insufficient to 
capture the idea, but they cannot be taken together since they are incompatible. Because the Chinese thinkers 
were never able to formulate a fully consistent and entirely satisfying solution to the tension in the conception of 
wu-wei, Slingerland concludes that this tension is a genuine paradox. 
vi
 This fourth tension can be explained by referring to redundancy effects which not only occur on the perceptual 
and conceptual level, but also with regard to goals. Many goals fade from consciousness as long as they remain 
predictable. Nevertheless, on the behavioural level these redundant goals continue to operate as goals. (Baars 
1988)  Having clear goals is important for flow to happen, but in absorption these goals fade from consciousness. 
vii
 Csikszentmihalyi addresses some of these tensions, the first, third and fourth of which he calls the conditions 
for flow. In more recent literature on flow the balance of subjectively perceived skills and challenges, having 
clear goals and immediate feedback are described as prerequisites and not as phenomenal aspects experienced 
during flow (Csikszentmihalyi 1997;  Csikszentmihalyi, Abuhamdehand and Nakamura  2005). Moreover, in his 
latest work Csikszentmihalyi omits the absence of self-consciousness in the list of characteristics of flow 
(Csikszentmihalyi 1999; Csikszentmihalyi et al. 2005). This change might be related to the problems raised by 
the internal tensions in the characterisation of flow.  
viii
 One can say a more advanced form of agency arises. Flow experiences can be compared to advanced stages of 
skill development, such as expressed by the notion of expertise (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986). In the first stages of 
skill development explicit narratives about what one is doing arise in consciousness. In more advanced stages the 
expert does not need these narratives and acts with an implicit situational understanding.  His actions are non-
reflective and intuitive. (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986)  Not only flow, but also wu-wei, can be associated with 
such an advanced form of agency (Velleman 2008). Following Harry Frankfurt, David Velleman (2008) believes 
reflective awareness is the most distinctive characteristic of humans. In flow and wu-wei this human essence is 
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temporarily transcended. According to Velleman this type of agency should not be seen as an alternative to 
reflective agency, but as the next step embodying the ultimate form of agency.  It is considered a higher form of 
agency since self-regulation is transcended but remains in reserve in case it is needed. 
ix
 As Csikszentmihalyi (1990 and 1998a) remarks, experiences of flow are very similar to differing forms of 
meditation, such as Yoga, Zen and many other techniques. 
x
 The main layers that Austin (2001) distinguishes are the sensory-motor self, the conceptual self and the 
affective self. 
xi
 Austin (2001) distinguishes two types of absorption. External absorption involves a merging of consciousness 
with an object or activity on which attention is totally focused. Most flow experiences are instances of this type. 
Meditation, on the other hand, mostly concerns an internal form of absorption in which attention is focused 
inward. 
xii
 In this sense the absence of self-consciousness during deep meditative absorption differs from the one in flow 
experiences. Flow experiences not necessarily involve an elimination of the emotional attachment to one‟s 
experiences. It is mainly the narrative dimension of the self that is absent. 
 
 
